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Complex Choices: 
Producers Risk Management Strategies 
 
50 Word Summary 
 
Producers have a wide variety of risk management instruments available. How do producers make 
a choice among all these possible combinations of risk management instruments? Using the 
recently developed choice bracketing framework, we examine what risk management strategies 
producers use and identify the factors that drive their risk management decisions.  
 
Abstract 
Producers have a wide variety of risk management instruments available. How do producers make 
a choice of risk management instruments? Using the recently developed choice bracketing 
framework, we examine what risk management strategies producers use and identify the factors 
that drive their risk management decisions. Our results identify that producers use a wide variety 
of combinations of risk management instruments and that they bracket their choices into sets of 
alternative risk management instruments. Using multinomial logit models to estimate the choice 
process provides information about the factors that influence producers’ decision making. The 
results show that broad bracketing producers use different risk management instruments than 
narrow bracketers. Policy makers and financial institutions can improve the performance of their 
programs and products when they are able to identify the bracketing level of segments of 
producers.    3
Introduction 
Farmers in the US continue to identify price and income risk among their greatest 
management challenges. To address this variability, farmers have numerous price and income risk 
management tools at their disposal, including: futures, options contracts, basis contracts and a 
variety of insurance products. While a few studies have examined farmer decision making in the 
presence of multiple market alternatives (e.g., Coble, et al), most research has examined the 
relatively simple decision of whether or not to use futures or crop insurance (for an example see 
Pennings and Leuthold (2000); Knight and Coble provide a review of insurance). However, the 
results of these studies do not reflect the integrated and complex nature of decisions that producers 
face. For example, dealing with 6 price risk management instruments, farmers face a total of 64 
(2
6) combinations of risk management instruments (e.g., risk management strategies). How do 
farmers deal with such complex choices? This paper is a first attempt to analyze producers’ 
complex decision process in a systematic way using the recently developed choice bracketing 
framework (e.g., Read, Loewenstein and Rabin). In addition, we examine the factors that drive 
producers’ decision to use particular combinations of risk management instruments. In this paper 
we contend that the notion of bracketing provides a useful way to understand how producers deal 
with complex decisions and how they arrive at the combinations of tools used.  
We illustrate the bracketing framework in the context of producers’ complex risk 
management decisions using data obtained from a large-scale survey of U.S. corn, cotton, soybean 
and wheat producers. The survey data was complemented by accounting data, allowing us to 
examine actual use of combinations of risk management instruments and the factors (e.g. producer 
and farm characteristics) that influence their risk management strategies.  This research has   4
implications for financial institutions that provide risk management instruments and for policy 
makers dealing with risk management in agriculture.  
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss how the economics and behavioral literature 
approaches complex decisions followed by the introduction of the choice bracketing framework in 
which the framework’s properties are discussed in the context of producers facing complex risk 
management choices. Subsequently the research design and research method are discussed 
followed by a presentation of the empirical results. Finally we discuss the implications of this 
work and make suggestions for future research. 
 
Complex Decisions 
In the (normative) economic literature it is often assumed that a decision-maker evaluates 
all available information and alternatives and is able to select that alternative (e.g., choice) that 
maximizes his/her utility. Various authors have reported that this approach may not be able to 
reflect actual behavior, as decision makers do not behave according to the proposed models 
(Rabin; McFadden; Thaler). Rabin, and Thaler provide an extensive discussion on how human 
behavior differs from that predicted by normative economic models. Behavioral economists have 
argued that individuals do not necessarily have stable and coherent preferences, and that they do 
not rationally maximize those preferences. The psychological literature offers some explanations 
for the existence of these anomalies arguing that there are cognitive limits with respect to human 
information processing capacities. Experiments have shown that individuals may in some cases 
simply fail to consider the entire space of choice alternatives (Miller). This notion led Simon to 
introduce the concept of bounded rationality. Simon’s concept of bounded rationality generated   5
literature that identified heuristics – rules used to solve problems or strategies of behavior - that 
decision makers use to arrive at their decisions (e.g., Earl).  
Decision makers vary with respect to the extent with which they take the consequences of 
their decisions into account. Each choice may have a very limited consequence. But if all the 
choices and their consequences are taken into account, the combined consequences can be 
substantial. This notion motivated Read, Loewenstein and Rabin to introduce the concept of 
choice bracketing to better understand how decision makers cope with complex decisions and how 
choices that do not seem rational from a normative point of view can be explained. 
 
Choice Bracketing Concept 
Choice bracketing refers to the grouping of individual choices together in sets. Sets of choices are 
bracketed together by taking into account the effect of each choice on all other choices in the set, 
but not choices outside the set. Read, Loewenstein and Rabin distinguish between narrow 
bracketing and broad bracketing strategies. Narrow bracketing refers to the situation when an 
individual makes decisions from sets that are small (e.g., producers considering only the 
consequences of using futures, or only the consequences of options, when deciding what risk 
management instruments to use), while broad brackets refer to the situation where an individual 
makes decisions from sets that are broad (e.g., considering the consequences of all available risk 
management instruments simultaneously). Assuming that the transactions costs of the decision 
making process are zero, broad bracketing allows individuals to consider all consequences of their 
actions and therefore generally leads to choices that yield higher utility than narrow bracketing.  
Most of the literature dealing with producers’ marketing choices studies the choice 
between using or not using a particular risk management. Combinations of different risk   6
management instruments and the interaction of the consequences of these instruments are usually 
not taken into account. A property of bracketed choices is the so-called adding-up effect. This 
effect reflects the fact that non-profitable choices can enhance each other’s profitability when they 
are put together. For instance, high yield variability decreases hedging (i.e., risk-reducing) 
effectiveness, but if yield insurance is purchased at the same time (i.e., yield stabilization), 
hedging effectiveness may increase. Another way in which choice bracketing affects individuals’ 
decisions is by taste change. This occurs when present choices influence future preferences. An 
example is habit formation, where individuals are able to recognize future favorable outcomes by 
choosing unwanted alternatives in the present (Pollak; Pope, Green and Eales; Dynan). This taste 
change property may be relevant for new marketing products, e.g. insurance and new derivatives. 
Producers might not recognize a new marketing product as a feasible alternative when bracketing 
narrowly (e.g., the choice whether or not to use the new marketing product), but they may acquire 
the habit of using it when bracketing broadly, even if the isolated consequence of using it is not 
desirable (e.g., the choice whether or not to use a particular combination of risk management 
instrument that includes a new product).  
 
Choice Bracketing Levels in the Context of Producers’ Choice of Risk Management Instruments 
Using the choice bracketing framework outlined above we discuss different bracketing levels in 
the context of a producer choosing among combinations of risk management instruments. Read, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin argue that utility is maximized when bracketing is broad, which in terms 
of risk management decisions implies that the entire set of risk management instruments (e.g., 
broad level in Figure 1) is considered.    7
Relevant risk management tools for producers include forward pricing instruments and 
crop insurance products. The forward pricing instruments considered in this study are cash 
forward contracts, futures, options, hedge-to-arrive contracts, minimum price contracts and basis 
contracts. The crop insurance products included in this study are Catastrophic coverage (CAT), 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Income Protection (IP), Revenue Assurance (RA), Group Risk 
Plan (GRP), and hail insurance. The appendix provides a detailed description of the twelve risk 
management instruments considered. 
Producers may choose any combination of the above mentioned risk management 
instruments. This implies that producers are implicitly or explicitly making a choice between 4096 
(2
6*2
6) combinations of forward pricing instruments and insurance products. The findings in the 
behavioral economics and psychological literature on human cognitive information processing 
capacities suggest that producers may have difficulty coping with such a broad bracketing level.  
One could simplify the choice, and hence narrow the bracketing level, by decomposing the 
total choice set (e.g., the 4096 alternative combinations of risk management instruments) in two 
separate groups of forward pricing instruments and crop insurance products (e.g., medium 
bracketing level). This medium bracketing level consist of two separate groups each containing 64 
(2
6) alternatives (e.g., combinations of the six price risk management instruments and 
combinations of the six insurance products, respectively).  
One could simplify this medium bracketing level further by decomposing the forward 
pricing instruments into three groups of exchange, exchange derived, and non-exchange derived 
tools and by decomposing the insurance products into three groups of catastrophic coverage, yield 
insurance and revenue insurance tools. The exchange group of forward pricing instruments 
includes futures and options, the exchange-derived group includes hedge-to-arrive and basis   8
contracts, and the non-exchange-derived group includes minimum price contracts and cash 
forward contracts. The catastrophic coverage group includes only one insurance product, 
catastrophic coverage (CAT), the yield insurance group includes GRP Area yield insurance and 
hail insurance and the revenue insurance group includes Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Income 
Protection, and Revenue Assurance.  
This framework of bracketing levels as shown in Figure 1, is an example of how producers 
may bracket their choices. Some producers may be broad bracketers (and hence consider the 4096 
alternatives simultaneously) other producers may have a medium bracket level. The medium 
bracketers make two choices in isolation, and hence do not consider the consequence of the other 
choice on the current choice. The producers that have a narrow bracketing level are dealing with 
six separate choice sets and hence six choices. 
We attempt to answer the following questions, based on the choice bracketing framework, 
in the remainder of this paper: What combinations of risk management instruments do producers 
actually use? What bracketing level do producers use? What producers’ characteristics are 
associated with a particular bracketing level? What factors are driving the choice within a 
particular bracketing level? In the next section we review literature that identified the factors that 
influence producer’s risk management.  
 
Determinants of Risk Management Behavior 
Most studies that investigated the determinants of the use of risk management instruments focused 
on a single risk management instrument. These studies model a producer choice process as a 
dichotomous choice (whether or not to use the instrument) and use logit or probit models to 
identify the factors that influence that dichotomous choice. Hence, producers’ choice behavior is   9
examined on a narrow bracketing level. Some studies examined producers’ choice on a broader 
bracketing level. for example Coble, Heifner and Zuniga, and Mahul used choice sets that 
included crop insurance and futures,  Katchova and Miranda  used choice sets that included 
futures, crop insurance, and cash marketing contracts. These studies seem to indicate that the 
drivers of producers’ choice for these larger choice sets are similar to the ones identified by studies 
that deal with narrow choice sets. Here we hypothesize that the drivers that may be important for 
small choice sets (narrow bracket level) are the same as for large choice sets (broad bracket level). 
Here, we hypothesize that the choice of risk management tools on all three bracketing levels is 
influenced by farm characteristics, operator characteristics, external sources of information, and 
geographic heterogeneity.  
 
 Farm Characteristics 
Previous studies identified farm size, diversification, and decision unit composition as farm 
characteristics relevant for risk management decisions. Farm size has a positive effect on the use 
of risk management tools. The costs of learning and implementing such tools every year can be 
more easily spread with high production, so that their usage is more easily justified in large-scale 
farms than in small farms. Livestock diversification  has been shown to have negative and 
significant affect on crop insurance participation (e.g., Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan; Cannon and 
Barnett). Pennings and Leuthold (2000) and Pennings and Garcia (2001) showed that the opinions 
of the members of producers decision making unit, such as spouse, partner and advisors may 
influence producers’ choices. Here we operationalize the concept of the decision making unit by 
1) internal decision makers, the number of individuals that have access to the producers’ satellite   10
delivered information system (DTN) and 2) external decision makers, whether or not the 
producer hires somebody to market the crops. 
 
Operator Characteristics 
 The  operator characteristics considered here are age, innovativeness, risk aversion, risk 
perception, and market orientation. Musser, Patrick, and Eckman argued that younger farmers 
have a longer planning horizon to recover the learning and adjustment costs associated with risk 
management instruments, and hence age may be negatively related with the use of risk 
management instruments. Goodwin and Schroeder examined the adoption of forward pricing 
methods. In that context, innovativeness becomes an important factor, as more innovative farmers 
are more likely to adopt new risk management tools. Based on the findings of Huffman and 
Mercier, and Putler and Zilberman this study uses the possession of a computer as a proxy for 
producer innovativeness. Pennings and Leuthold (2000) showed a positive relationship between 
risk attitude, risk perception, and market orientation, and producers’ use of risk management 
instruments. We used the scale developed by Pennings and Smidts (2000) to measure risk attitude 
and risk perception, and we used the work by Jaworski and Kohli for measuring producers’ market 
orientation. In addition to market orientation this study hypothesizes that producer involvement in 
marketing their crops may play a significant role in the use of risk management instruments. 
Producer involved in marketing crops are likely to be more aware of the risks in the market place 
and prone to marketing instruments. We hypothesize a positive relationship between involvement 
and the use of risk management tools. 
 
External Sources of Information   11
Davis and Patrick, Pennings et al (2004), Isengildina et al demonstrate that the use of 
external information affects the use of forward pricing by producers. In this study we hypothesize 
that university extension service, market advisory services, satellite delivery systems (such as 
DTN),  USDA reports,  local elevator, and the internet may affect producer use of risk 
management tools. The direction of the relationship depends on the informational content of these 
sources. Table 1 presents the definitions, measurements and descriptive statistics of the 
determinants discussed in this section. 
 
Geographic Heterogeneity 
Pennings and Leuthold (2000) showed that producers are heterogeneous with respect to the 
use of risk management tools. Part of this heterogeneity may be attributed to geographic location, 
which is associated with particular crops and natural hedge conditions.  
 
Research Design 
We conducted in-depth interviews with U.S. crop producers to gain insight in the combination of 
risk management instrument used, to examine the bracket levels used and to identify producer 
characteristics associated with a particular bracketing level and the factors driving the choices 
within a bracketing level. The depth-interviews were conducted with a group of 15 large 
commercial farmers in Champaign, Illinois and two groups discussions each with 16 large 
commercial farmers in Omaha Nebraska. During the group discussions the risk management 
decision-making process was discussed. Most striking during these discussions was the producers’ 
lack of agreement about the appropriate risk management strategy. Different combinations of risk   12
management instruments were suggested. These in-depth interviews formed the basis of our 
survey instrument. 
 
Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
The details of survey development are available in Pennings, Irwin and Good (2002).  The 
questionnaire was sent to 3,990 US crop producers in January 2000. A total of 1109 usable 
questionnaires were returned, yielding a relatively high response rate (Jobber; Karimabady and 
Brunn). The survey data were complemented by accounting data about these crop producers, made 
available through the U.S. firm that delivers agricultural market information and advisory services 
via satellite. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the (psychometric) measurement quality of 
our latent variables: producers’ risk attitude, risk perception, and market orientation (Hair et al). 
For a detailed description of a factor-analytical model, the reader is referred to Pennings and 




Bracketing Levels & Choice Sets: Producers’ Choice of Risk Management Strategies 
As discussed before we hypothesize that producers’ complex risk management decision process 
may take place on three bracketing levels. Figure 2 displays the three bracketing levels, the choice 
sets within each of these levels and the number of strategies (e.g., alternative combinations of risk 
management tools) within each choice set: 
I.  A broad bracketing level which reflects a choice of risk management tools that include 
combinations of forward pricing and crop insurance (1 choice set, 4 strategies) 
   13
II.  A medium bracketing level which reflects a combination of (2 choice sets, 16 
strategies) 
 
     1) 3 types of forward pricing tools (8 strategies),  
2) 3 types of crop insurance products (8 strategies)  
 
III.  A narrow bracketing level which reflects combinations of particular instruments (6 
choice sets, 26 strategies) 
 
1) 2 exchange forward pricing instruments (4 strategies) 
2) 2 exchange-derived forward pricing instruments (4 strategies) 
3) 2 non-exchange-derived forward pricing instruments (4 strategies) 
4) 2 Yield Insurance products (4 strategies) 
5) 3 Revenue Insurance products (8strategies) 
6) CAT insurance use (2 strategies) 
 
Figure 2 displays the bracketing levels, choice sets and strategies within a choice set by means of 
0/1 codes, where a 0 indicates not using the particular risk management instrument and 1 using it. 
We provide now three examples of particular strategies displayed in Figure 2. At the broad 
bracketing level in choice set A strategy 2 consists of using a forward pricing tool and not using a 
crop insurance product. At the medium bracketing level in Choice set B strategy 2 consists of 
using exchange instruments and not using non-exchange derived instruments and not using 
exchange-derived instruments. At the narrow bracketing level in choice set I strategy 2 consists of 
using Crop Revenue Coverage, not using Income Protection or Revenue Assurance (RA). 
To examine what bracket levels producers use and to identify the factors that drive the 
choice within a choice set of a particular bracketing level we estimated the choice process for each 
choice set using a multinomial logit model in which the producer selection of a risk management 
strategy (e.g., combination of alternative risk management instruments) is explained by the 
determinants of risk management behavior discussed above. A total of nine models are estimated. 
The dependent variable in each model is the number of risk management strategies within a choice   14
set. For example, in choice set C the dependent variables can take on values from 1 – 8 
corresponding to the strategies used. 
The choices are coded in such a way that the alternatives on the narrower level are 
embedded into alternatives on a broader level. Thus, the 4 alternatives in the choice set at the 
broad bracketing level implicitly contains 4096 combinations of risk management tools. Similarly, 
the 8 alternatives in each of the two choice sets at the medium bracketing levels implicitly contain 
64 combinations of risk management tools. The narrow bracketing level is described by the actual 
or explicit combinations of risk management tools (i.e. the twelve risk management instruments 
examined here).  Hence, narrow choices are nested into the broader choices. The models are 
estimated using multinomial logit framework because of the discrete nature of the dependent 
variables. The advantage of this estimation procedure is its ease of application and interpretation. 
However, this approach assumes that the covariance of    errors is a diagonal matrix for each 
respondent n (independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption). In the near future we plan 
to use a multinomial probit modeling procedure that relaxes the IIA assumption. 
 
Results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample can be classified as relatively 
large commercial farmers with experience (median age class is 40-44 years). The major crops 
(expressed in acreages) are corn, soybeans and wheat. Cash forward contracts are a popular risk 
management instrument (80.7% of the crop producers used them during the two year period 1999-
2000), followed by basis contracts (41.8%), futures contracts (40.1%) and (put) options (36%). 
Hedge-to-arrive contracts and minimum price contracts are less popular (19.9% and 13.6% 
respectively). Catastrophic coverage and crop revenue coverage are the most popular insurance   15
products. Insurance products directly related to income, such as the income protection, revenue 
assurance and group risk plan, are less popular insurance products.  
 
Combinations of Forward Pricing Instrument Used by Producers 
  Crop producers have in theory 64 (2
6) possible combinations of forward pricing instruments. 
The data shows that only 54 combinations are actually used. Interestingly, and in line with the 
results of the group discussions, there is no clear dominant combination. It appears that 23 price 
risk management instrument combinations account for 88.5% of all combinations used, as 
displayed in Table 3.  
 
Combinations of Crop Insurance Products Used by Producers 
Since there are 6 relevant insurance products, and a producer can choose any combination (or not 
use them at all), there are 64 (2
6 ) alternatives available. Of the 64 possible combinations, 41 
combinations are actually being used. The distribution of the different insurance product 
combinations is less flat than that of the forward pricing instrument combinations. Table 4 shows 
that 13 combinations account for 91% of all combinations used.  
 
Combining Forward Pricing Instruments and Insurance Products 
When considering both forward pricing instruments and insurance products crop producers 
implicitly or explicitly choose from 4096 (2
6*2
6) combinations of forward pricing instruments and 
insurance products. Their decision, then, consists of choosing one risk management strategy out of 
4096 possible strategies. The crop producers in our sample used 375 different combinations of 
price risk management instruments and insurance products. Thus, only 10.4% of the total   16
combination space (4096) is actually being used by crop producers. The distribution of these 375 
combinations is flat, i.e., there are not many dominant combinations. Table 5 displays those 
combinations used by more than 1% of the crop producers. 14 combinations meet these criteria, 
together accounting for 28% of all applied combinations.  
 
What Factors Drive Producers Risk Management Choices? 
Results of Multinomial Logit models 
Parameter estimates of the multinomial logit models are presented in Tables 6-8.  
The results of all nine models (e.g. the choice sets at the different bracketing levels) are relative to 
the choice set that has no risk management instruments, as described by strategy 1 on all 
bracketing levels (Figure 2). All nine models perform reasonably well. The predictive validity on 
the broad bracketing level was 75%, on the medium bracketing level it ranged from 34 to 40%, on 
the narrow bracketing level it ranged from 53 to 74%.  
The proposed framework allows us to examine whether the same drivers affect producer’s 
decision making on various bracketing levels and choice sets. The results presented in Table 6 
suggest that broad bracketing decisions are affected by farm size, operator age, use of external 
decision makers, use of satellite delivery systems, information from local elevators and geographic 
heterogeneity. Consistent with our expectations, younger operators of larger farms, who are more 
involved in marketing their crops appear more likely to use risk management tools. Contrary to 
our expectations the use of satellite delivery systems decreased the probability of use of risk 
management instruments. 
On the medium bracketing level (Table 7), all variables except for university extension 
services and the use of computers have a significant (at the 90% level or better) influence on   17
producer risk management decisions. The signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with 
those at the broad bracketing level with one exception, the use of external decision makers has a 
positive impact on the use of risk management tool in the medium bracket level and negative on 
the broad bracketing level. Similar to the broad bracketing results, younger operators of larger 
farms appear more likely to use risk management instruments. The composition of decision 
making unit is also important on this bracketing level: the use of external decision makers 
increases the likelihood of using risk management instruments and the greater number of internal 
decision makers increases the use of crop insurance products. Producers that are more involved in 
marketing their crops and those who use MAS and internet as their source of information are more 
likely to use risk management instruments, regardless of their insurance choices. The use of 
satellite information systems and local elevators appear to discourage the use of forward pricing 
instruments and encourage the use of yield insurance products. The use of USDA reports increases 
the probability of combining exchange and exchange-derived pricing tools and discourages the use 
of yield insurance products in combination with CAT coverage. More risk averse producers appear 
more likely to combine all thee types of crop insurance. Risk perception increases the probability 
of using non-exchange derived pricing instruments and using only a CAT coverage crop 
insurance. Greater market orientation increases the probability of combining CAT coverage and 
revenue insurance products. Producers in the Great Plains are less likely to use certain 
combinations of forward pricing instruments and more crop insurance while producers in the 
Southeast use more strategies that include forward pricing instruments and less crop insurance 
combinations relative to Midwestern producers. 
On the narrow bracketing level all variables except for the number of internal decision 
makers are significant (at the 90% level or better) for forward pricing decisions (Table 8, panel A)   18
and all variables except for the use of external decision makers, operator involvement and USDA 
reports are significant for crop insurance choice decisions Table 8, panel B). Directions of the 
effects are consistent with the broader bracketing levels described above for farm size, operator 
age, use of external decision makers (but become insignificant in crop insurance choices), operator 
involvement, use of MAS, satellite information systems, USDA reports (but become insignificant 
in crop insurance choices), local elevator, and geographic location. Diversification (with livestock) 
discourages strategies that include both yield insurance products, isolated use of income protection 
insurance, hedge-to-arrive contracts or in combination with basis contracts, and combinations of 
minimum price and cash forward contracts. Risk perception discourages risk management 
strategies that involve combining futures and options, and combining CRC and Revenue 
Assurance products. Risk aversion has a negative significant relationship with the use of exchange 
forward pricing instruments while market orientation has a positive relationship. University 
extension service tends to lower the use of futures and increase the use of income protection 
insurance. The use of internet as a source of information has a positive relationship with the use of 
revenue insurance instruments. 
The consistencies between the models (e.g., choice sets) with respect to the factors that 
influence the use of risk management strategies on the different bracketing levels show that the 
decisions in general are driven by the same factors. Some differences exist though. These 
differences suggest that decisions on the broad bracketing level are affected by more general 
characteristics (e.g., age and farm size), while decisions on the narrow bracketing level are 
associated with relatively more specific features, such as risk aversion, risk perception, and 
producer’s innovativeness. Two factors, the use of external decision makers and satellite services 
appear more relevant on the broader bracket levels than on the narrower ones. The fact that the   19
direction of some relationships changes across bracketing levels illustrates the adding-up effect: 
non-profitable choices can enhance each other’s profitability only when they are considered 
simultaneously in the choice set. On the other hand, choices that are attractive on the narrow 
bracketing level may become redundant when combined with other choices on a broader level. 
Next we examine whether producers that differ regarding their bracketing level have different 
characteristics. Furthermore we examine the risk management strategies that are chosen at 
different bracketing levels.  
 
Broad vs. Narrow Choice Bracketers 
Choice bracketing may be an attractive approach to model complex decisions. The difficulty is 
that bracketing is an abstract and unobserved concept. An individual may have a hard time 
classifying him(her)self as a broad or narrow bracketer. However, it is the choices that individuals 
make that reveal tendencies to bracket broadly or narrowly. Here we identify the bracketing level 
of producers based on the choices they made and our ability to predict their choices. Figure 3 
presents the results of our multinomial logit models for the choice sets for the three bracketing 
levels in terms of predictive ability.  
Figure 3 shows the number of actual versus predicted choices for all models (e.g., the different 
choice sets at the three bracketing levels) described in the previous section. The results are used to 
classify producers as broad, medium, or narrow bracketers in the following manner: if the models 
correctly predicted at least one choice (e.g., the choice within a choice set) on a particular bracket 
level, a producer is assumed to be bracketing on this level. Using this procedure, 839 producers 
may be considered broad bracketers, 652 medium bracketers and 1106 narrow bracketers. This 
classification produces a wide overlap between brackets, that is the procedure may classify a   20
producer as being both a broad and medium level bracketer. This may be consistent with the fact 
that producers may approach a complex choice by using various bracketing strategies. Our sample 
contained 565 producers that bracket their choices on all three levels. To further increase our 
insight in the bracketing level of producers we identified producers that bracket consistently on the 
same level. Our sample contained 3 producers that bracket exclusively on a broad level, no 
producer bracketed only on a medium level and 131 producers bracketed exclusively on a narrow 
level. We discuss the characteristics of the narrow bracketers. Table 9 shows that 33% did not use 
any forward pricing tools, 74% did not use any crop insurance products and 8% did not use any 
risk management tools. The choices of the narrow bracketers in both forward pricing and crop 
insurance are dominated by not using these risk management instruments. The distribution of the 
risk management strategies is more flat than the broad bracketers, with no dominant strategies. 
However, most of these choices may be characterized by the limited use of risk management tools 
with the five most common strategies (which comprise 37 percent of all used alternatives) 
combining only two instruments or less. This finding supports the notion that risk management 
products may be less attractive when viewed individually or on a narrow bracketing level. Broad 
marketers use significantly more tools then narrow bracketers, which reflects the adding-up effect 
of choice bracketing.  
 
Conclusions & Discussion  
Previous studies examining producers’ risk management decisions often dealt with the relative 
simple choice whether or not producers used a particular risk management instrument. In practice 
producers are confronted with a much more complex decision context. For example, producers in 
the U.S. have about six relevant price risk management instruments and six insurance products at   21
their disposal, resulting in a decision space of 4096 alternatives. While economic theory assumes 
that decision-maker evaluate all available information and hence all available alternatives, the 
behavioral economics, decision sciences and psychological literature have shown that cognitive 
limitations make it impossible for humans to make such “full information” choices. Various 
authors have argued that decision makers simply the complex choice process by using heuristics. 
Recently Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin introduced the concept of choice bracketing. This concept 
suggests that decision makers “bracket” their choices into sets, so that the effect of each choice in 
the set is taken into account on all other choices in the set but not between choice sets. Bracketing 
can be seen as a means to simply the complex decisions in terms of the number of alternative 
outcomes that decision makers face. Here we use the choice bracketing concept to better 
understand how producers arrive at their risk management choices, in particularly how they arrive 
at the combination of risk management instruments used. 
For our sample we propose that risk management choices may take place on three 
bracketing levels: broad, medium, and narrow. The broad level includes one choice sets each 
containing four strategies (combinations of risk management instruments). The medium level 
consists of two choice sets each containing eight strategies. The narrow level consists of six choice 
sets that contain between two to eight alternatives. Producer choices are evaluated in terms of the 
use of risk management strategies in terms of a combination of risk management instruments 
rather than the use of (single) products, as has been done in previous studies. 
We estimated for each choice set the influence of a number factors associated with risk 
management. The results showed that the choice sets for the different bracketing levels are 
generally driven by the same factors. Our results suggest also that on the broad bracketing level 
choices are affected by more general characteristics (e.g., age and farm size), while decisions on   22
the narrow bracketing level are associated with relatively more specific producer’s characteristics, 
such as risk aversion, risk perception, and innovativeness. Some factors, such as use of external 
decision makers and satellite services appear more relevant on the broader levels than on the 
narrower ones.  
Various caveats of the research should be mentioned. We assumed that there are three 
bracketing levels and created the various choice sets at each bracket level. For example, on the 
medium bracket level we assumed that the choice sets could be defined based on whether price 
risk management instruments were exchange traded, derived from exchange traded instruments or 
non-exchange derived instruments. While such a classification of price risk management 
instruments seems intuitive, we did not actually validate whether such classification reflects the 
way producers think when they bracket their choices. Further research needs to identify what 
choice sets are relevant for producers by having a qualitative research design that allows producers 
to indicate their relevant choice sets. 
 While the concept of choice bracketing is helpful in understanding how producers deal 
with complex choices, we find individual producers that are broad, medium and narrow 
bracketers. These results may indicate that producers decision making process can best be 
described as a ongoing, dynamic process, in which the producer may first tackle the complex 
decision by bracketing narrow, and after that “exercise” may decide to bracket more broadly. 
We were unable to identify a priori what bracket level and hence what choice sets are 
relevant for different segments of producers. Here we attempted to determine the producers’ 
bracket level ex-post, using predictive validity of the models. Based on the predictive ability we 
classified a producer as being a broad or narrow bracketer. This procedures assumes that the 
factors associated with risk management strategies, our independent variables in the multinomial   23
logit model, are equally important for all producers, an assumption that may not hold (e.g., 
Pennings and Garcia, 2004). Research that will allow these factors to have different influence 
across producers and choice sets is called for. 
The results have implications for financial institutions that provide risk management 
instruments and for policy makers dealing risk management programs in agriculture. Our results 
indicate that exchanges and brokerage firms need to know whether a producer is a broad or narrow 
bracketer because of the adding-up effect described above. Furthermore a broad bracketer will 
evaluate the consequences of a variety of risk management instruments simultaneously and the 
interaction between them. Hence complementarity among instruments becomes an important issue 
when designing new risk management instruments. For policy makers it is important to understand 
how their programs may enter producers’ choice sets. Producers who bracket narrowly may fail to 
see the complementary between the program and, for example, existing risk management tools and 
may decide not to participate in the program. Knowledge about the size of the segments of 
producers with respect to bracketing levels and how these segments can be identified is crucial for 
successful risk management policy.   24
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Table 1. Independent Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (N=1109). 
Variable Definition  Mean Std. 
dev. 
Farm Characteristics    
Farm Size  Total acres (owned and rented): 1= over 2,000 acres, 2=1,999 to 




Diversification  1 if a crop farm included a livestock operation, 0 otherwise  0.43  0.50 
Decision 
Makers 
Number of individuals with access to your DTN unit  2.70  1.38 
External Dec. 
Makers 
1 if hire someone to market any or all of your crops, 0 otherwise  0.15  0.36 
Operator Characteristics:    
Age  approximate age of primary subscriber: 1=less than 25 yrs, 2=25 to 
29, 3=30 to 34, 4=35 to 39, 5=40 to 44, 6=45 to 49, 7=50 to 59, 
8=60 to 64, 9=65 and older 
 
5.06 1.62 
Innovativeness  1 if and operator owns or leases a computer, 0 otherwise 
 
0.66 0.47 
Risk Aversion  See scale developed in Pennings and Smidts (2000) (where 1 




See scale developed in Pennings and Smidts (2000) (where 1 is not 




See scale developed in Pennings and Leuthold (2000) (where 1 
indicates relatively less market oriented and 9 relatively more 
market oriented) 
7.28 1.23 
Involvement  “How often do you follow cash or futures market prices?” 
1=several times a day, 2=once a day, 3=once to several times a 
week, 4=once to several times a month, 5=never 
1.31 0.61 
External Sources of Information:    
Extension  3.90 2.33 
MAS  5.85 2.50 
Satellite  7.83 1.55 
USDA  5.48 2.25 
Elevator  5.06 2.54 
Internet 
“How much do you rely on the following sources of market 
information?” 1=do not rely, 9=rely heavily 
3.14 2.56 
Geographic Heterogeneity:    
MIDWEST  1 if producer is from the Midwest, 0 otherwise  0.57  0.49 
GPLAINS  1 if producer is from the Great Planes, 0 otherwise  0.34  0.48 
SEAST  1 if producer is from the South East, 0 otherwise  0.08  0.28   27
 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
 
          
Percentage of crop producers that 
used one of the following price risk 
management instruments in 
1999/2000 
  Insurance    Age    Gross annual farm sales 
                  
Cash forward contract  80.7 %    Catastrophic coverage  42.4 %    Younger than 25 years  0.8 %    Over $ 1,000,0000  17.3 % 
Basis contracts  41.8 %    Crop Revenue Coverage   47.7 %    25 – 29 years  4.2 %     $ 999,999 - $ 500,000  26.0 %  
Futures contracts  40.1 %    Only hail insurance   21.1 %    30 – 34 years  12.4 %    $ 499,999 - $ 400,000  13.3 % 
Put options  36.0 %    Group Risk Plan (GRP)   9.4 %    35 – 39 years  20.3 %    $ 399,999 - $ 300,000  15.0 % 
Hedge-to-arrive contracts  19.9 %    Income protection (IP)  5.6 %    40 – 44 years  19.7 %    $ 299,999 - $ 200,000  16.9 % 
Minimum price contracts  13.6 %    Revenue assurance (RA)  5.1 %    45 – 49 years  17.6 %    $ 199,999 - $ 100,000  10.0 % 
            50 – 59 years  19.6 %    $  99,999 - $  50,000  1.3 % 
            60 – 64 years  3.5 %     Less than $  50,000  .2 % 
            65 years and older  1.9 %       
                  
Crop acreage (planted annually) 
 
   Corn    Sorghum  Soybean    Wheat  Cotton  Rice  Hay 
Over 2,000 acres    4.5 %    1.1 %  2.9 %    9.1 %  2.2 %  .4 %  5.2 % 
1,999 – 1,500 acres    16.3 %    1.5 %  10.9 %    14.7 %  3.7 %  1.3 %  3.1 % 
1,499 – 1,000 acres    42.3 %    3.0 %  34.2 %    16.3 %  4.7 %  1.8 %  5.4 % 
999 – 500 acres    7.9 %    5.1 %  14.4 %    8.0 %  1.5 %  1.1 %  7.1 % 
499 – 300 acres    6.9 %    8.3 %  9.9 %    13.3 %  .6 %  .8 %  14.9 % 
Under 300 acres    2.9 %    6.6 %  4.6 %    12.4 %  .4 %  .1 %                    21.3 % 
No acres    19.3 %    74.5 %  23.1 %    26.2 %  87.0 %  94.6 %  42.9 % 
Notes: The sample consists of 1109 US crop producers in the Midwest, South East and Great Plains. The crop producers’ age, gross 
annual farm sales, and crop acreage were obtained from accounting data. Data on usage of price risk management instruments and 
insurance products were measured during the survey.  28
























           %   Σ % 
1  1 0  0  0 0 0  19.6  19.6 
2  1 1  1  0 0 0  7.6  27.1 
3  1 0  0  0 0 1  6.9  34.1 
4  0 0  0  0 0 0  6.8  40.8 
5  1  1 0 0  0  0  6.3 47.2 
6  1 1  1  0 0 1  6.0  53.2 
7  1 0  1  0 0 0  4.0  57.2 
8  1 1  0  0 0 1  3.5  60.7 
9  1 0  0  1 0 1  3.4  64.1 
10  1 0  1  0 0 1  2.9  67.0 
11  1 1  1  1 0 1  2.9  69.9 
12  0 0  0  0 0 1  2.4  72.3 
13  1 1  0  1 0 1  2.3  74.7 
14  1 1  1  1 1 1  2.2  76.8 
15  1 1  1  1 0 0  1.5  78.4 
16  1 0  0  0 1 0  1.4  79.8 
17  1 0  0  0 1 1  1.4  81.2 
18  1 0  1  0 1 1  1.4  82.7 
19  0 1  1  0 0 0  1.4  84.0 
20  0 1  0  0 0 0  1.2  85.2 
21  0 0  1  0 0 0  1.1  86.3 
22  1 0  0  1 0 0  1.1  87.4 
23 1  0  1  1  0  1  1.1  88.5 
            
Note: N=1109: 1=use, 0=do not use. 
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          %   Σ % 
1 0 1  0 0  0 0  25.7  25.7 
2 0 0  0 0  0 0  14.1  39.8 
3 1 0  0 0  0 0  13.6  53.4 
4 1 1  0 0  0 0  10.5  63.8 
5 1 0  0 0  0 1  7.5  71.3 
6 1 1  0 0  0 1  4.1  75.5 
7 0 1  0 0  0 1  3.1  78.5 
8 0 0  0 0  1 0  3.0  81.5 
9 0 0  0 0  1 0  2.8  84.3 
10  0 0  1 0  0 0  1.7  86.0 
11  0 0  0 1  0 0  1.6  87.6 
12  1 0  0 0  1 0  1.5  89.2 
13  0 1  0 0  1 0  1.4  90.6 
             
Note: N=1109: 1=use, 0=do not use. 
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%  Σ % 
1  1  0  0  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  5.0  5.0 
2  1  0  0  0 0 0  1  0  0  0  0  0  3.1  8.0 
3  1  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.5  10.6 
4  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2.2  12.7 
5  1  1  1  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2.2  14.9 
6  1  0  0  0 0 0  1  1  0  0  0  0  2.0  16.9 
7  1  0  0  0 0 0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1.9  18.8 
8  1  0  0  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  20.3 
9  1  1  0  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1.5  21.8 
10  1  0  0  0 0 1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1.4  23.3 
11  1  1  1  0 0 0  1  1  0  0  0  0  1.3  24.5 
12  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.1  25.6 
13  1  0  1  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1.1  26.7 
14  1  1  1  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.1  27.8 
                           









Diversification 0.223 0.094 0.405
Decision Makers -0.275 -0.344 -0.229






Innovativeness -0.044 -0.089 -0.045
Risk Aversion 0.100 0.163 0.169
Risk Perception 0.177 0.263 0.212
Market Orientation 0.247 0.359 0.310
Involvement -0.017 0.481 -0.149
Extension 0.038 0.048 0.055





USDA 0.061 0.040 0.005
Elevator -0.225
* -0.099 -0.151
Internet 0.167 0.093 0.175
GPLAINS -1.279
** 0.546 -0.679
SEAST 27.997 27.478 27.738
Notes: Strategies correspond to broad level bracketing strategies described in Figure 2.
Choice Set A. Risk Management Tools
23 4
 31Table 7.  Estimated Coefficients of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of Medium Level Bracketing. 




** 0.780 3.343 -2.292
** -1.978 -0.600 -1.544 -0.704 -2.673
** -3.642
**











* 0.115 -0.007 0.494 0.266 0.192 -0.024 0.373
* 0.265 -0.258 0.156 -0.516

















** -0.054 -0.018 -0.218
** -0.119 -0.208
**
Innovativeness 0.207 -0.386 0.101 0.048 0.110 0.037 0.002 0.043 -0.007 0.022 0.195 -0.339 -0.004 -0.035
Risk Aversion -0.133 -0.047 -0.062 0.044 -0.041 -0.024 0.164 0.016 -0.046 0.105 0.089 0.056 0.089 0.212
*
Risk Perception 0.020 -0.162 -0.051 -0.020 -0.065 0.092 0.023
** 0.125
** 0.018 0.070 0.002 0.067 -0.007 0.012









** -0.074 0.096 0.004 -0.126 -0.401 -0.093 -0.176







** 0.133 -0.027 -0.013 0.059 -0.048 0.011 0.020 0.039
Satellite -0.071 -0.087 0.012 0.045 0.015 0.030 -0.068
** 0.039 0.242
** -0.038 0.086 -0.046 0.098 0.069
USDA -0.157 0.266
** -0.012 -0.020 0.063 -0.144 -0.054 0.014 -0.165
** -0.019 -0.105




** -0.013 -0.031 0.006 0.124
** 0.065 0.025 0.065 0.122
** 0.043
Internet 0.173
** 0.017 0.096 0.100 0.127
** 0.159
** 0.041 0.013 -0.040 -0.010 0.002 0.059 0.010 0.097

















Notes: Strategies correspond to medium level bracketing strategies described in Figure 2.
Choice Set B. Forward Pricing Tools Choice Set C. Crop Insurance Products
 32Table 8.  Estimated Coefficients of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of Narrow Level Bracketing. 
Panel A: Forward Pricing Tools.
Strategy* 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
Constant 0.311 -2.211
** 1.000 -2.424










** 0.025 -0.261 -0.406
*





** -0.003 0.147 0.363 1.390
** -0.151 -0.150







Innovativeness -0.140 0.062 0.327




** -0.087 -0.050 0.007 0.080 0.084 0.068
Risk Perception -0.067 0.001 -0.115




** 0.173 0.096 0.064 -0.270 0.037 0.057
Involvement -0.586
** 0.075 -0.931














Satellite -0.044 0.057 0.032 0.067 0.058 0.029 -0.226
* 0.023 0.035
USDA 0.070 0.054 0.074
* -0.005 0.057 0.103
** -0.075 0.019 0.086
Elevator -0.088
** -0.037 -0.164
** 0.028 -0.005 -0.007 0.594
** -0.045 0.016
Internet 0.065
* 0.036 0.039 0.054 0.056
* 0.019 0.180
** 0.008 0.002







SEAST -0.564 -0.077 -0.628
* -0.379 1.057
** 0.605
* -29.350 -0.466 -0.622
Notes: Strategies correspond to narrow level bracketing strategies described in Figure 2.
Choice Set D. Exchange Choice Set E. Exchange-Derived Choice Set F. Non-Exchange-Derived
 33Table 8.  Estimated Coefficients of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of Narrow Level Bracketing. 
Panel B: Crop Insurance Products.
Strategy 2 2 3 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant -1.662
** -2.033 -3.437 -1.034 -0.362 -1.560 -7.305
** -3.779 106.134 -6.988
** -10.632
**
Farm Size -0.021 -0.057 -0.869
** -0.031 -0.041 -0.079 0.235 -0.357 -30.445 0.096 0.237
Diversification -0.069 -0.056 -0.288 -0.369
** 0.138 -0.697
* -0.210 -0.617 -100.994 0.268 -0.837
Decision Makers 0.036 -0.142 -0.023 -0.102
* 0.030 0.240
** 0.220 0.091 8.584 0.110 0.158
External Dec. 




** 0.000 0.008 -0.193 -28.580 0.157 0.104
Innovativeness 0.074 -0.317 1.126
* -0.027 -0.023 -0.137 -0.229 -1.130
** -265.161 0.214 -0.536
Risk Aversion 0.032 -0.147
* -0.096 0.089 0.089
* 0.231
* -0.069 -0.131 -55.851 0.119 -0.117
Risk Perception -0.006 0.024 -0.119 -0.031 0.007 -0.008 0.194
* -0.082 5.283 -0.183
* 0.163
Orientation 0.054 0.212
** 0.135 0.046 -0.003 -0.133 0.517
** 0.306 23.049 0.191 0.312
Involvement -0.077 0.037 -0.395 -0.120 -0.070 -0.228 0.340 -0.034 -15.396 0.212 0.917
Extension 0.036 0.068 -0.094 0.013 -0.030 -0.138
* -0.051 -0.034 23.321 -0.159 -0.190
MAS -0.038 -0.070 -0.104 -0.012 0.071
** 0.064 0.023 -0.012 -7.091 0.062 0.019
Satellite 0.075
* 0.075 0.162 0.068 -0.056 -0.170
* -0.232
** 0.046 -11.654 0.177 -0.030
USDA -0.013 -0.077 -0.008 -0.060 0.030 0.000 -0.073 -0.071 4.744 -0.130 0.176
Elevator -0.006 -0.040 0.137 0.018 0.049
* 0.021 0.072 0.164 1.119 0.044 -0.133




* 0.391 -0.075 -0.063 0.276
* 0.774
** 0.030 0.837 102.254 -0.677 0.850
SEAST 1.332
** -0.050 -1.027 -0.271 -0.859
** -37.528 -1.238 0.737 -47.402 -1.181 2.784
*
Notes: Strategies correspond to narrow level bracketing strategies described in Figure 2.
Choice Set H. Yield Insurance Choice Set I. Revenue Insurance
Choice Set 
G. CAT
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Table 9. Combinations of Risk Management Tools Used by Narrow Bracketing Crop 
Producers in 1999-2000. 





















           %   Σ % 
1  0 0  0  0 0 0  32.8  32.8 
2  1 0  0  0 0 1  9.9  42.7 
3  1 0  0  0 0 0  9.2  51.9 
4  1 1  0  0 0 0  5.3  57.3 
5  1  0 0 0  1  1  4.6 61.8 
6  1 0  0  1 0 1  3.8  65.6 
7  0 0  0  0 0 1  3.1  68.7 
8  1 0  1  0 0 0  3.1  71.8 
9  0 1  0  0 0 0  2.3  74.0 
10  1 1  1  0 0 0  2.3  76.3 
11  1 1  1  0 0 1  2.3  78.6 
12  0 0  0  1 0 0  1.5  80.2 
13  0 0  0  1 0 1  1.5  81.7 
14  0 1  1  0 0 0  1.5  83.2 
15  1 0  1  0 0 1  1.5  84.7 
16  1 1  0  0 0 1  1.5  86.3 
17  1 1  0  1 1 1  1.5  87.8 
18 10  1  1  0  1  0  1.5  89.3 
            
 
























           %   Σ % 
1  0 0 0  0 0  0  74.0  74.0 
2  1 0 0  0 0  0  6.1  80.2 
3  0 0 0  0 1  0  3.8  84.0 
4  1 0 0  0 0  1  3.8  87.8 
5  1 1 0  0 0  0  3.1  90.8 
6  0 1 0  0 0  0  2.3  93.1 
              
Note: N=1109: 1=use, 0=do not use. 
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Table 9 (Continued). Combinations of Risk Management Tools Used by Narrow Bracketing Crop Producers in 1999-2000. 


























CRC IP  RA GRP  Only  hail 
insurance
%  Σ % 
1  1  0  0  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  9.9  9.9 
2  1  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  8.4  18.3 
3  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  7.6  26.0 
4  0  0  0  0 0 0  1  0  0  0  0  0  6.1  32.1 
5  1  1  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  5.3  37.4 
6  1  0  0  0 1 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  4.6  42.0 
7  0  0  0  0 0 0  1  0  0  0  0  1  3.8  45.8 
8  1  0  0  1 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  3.8  49.6 
9  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  1  0  3.1  52.7 
10  0  0  0  0 0 0  1  1  0  0  0  0  3.1  55.7 
11  0  0  0  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  3.1  58.8 
12  1  0  1  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3.1  61.8 
13  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2.3  64.1 
14  0  1  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.3  66.4 
15  1  1  1  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.3  68.7 
16  1  1  1  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  2.3  71.0 
17  0  0  0  1 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  72.5 
18  0  0  0  1 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  74.0 
19  0  1  1  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  75.6 
20  1  0  1  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  77.1 
21  1  1  0  0 0 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  78.6 
22  1  1  0  1 1 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  80.2 
23  1  1  1  0 1 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1.5  81.7 
                           




































Pricing   Insurance 
Exchange    CAT 
Exchange-derived         Yield Insurance 
Non-exchange      Revenue Insurance 















































10 0 00 00 0 00 0 0 0
21 0 10 10 1 10 1 0 0
30 1 01 01 01 0 1 0





Figure 2.  Crop Producer Risk Management Strategies.



























































































Choice Set B Choice Set C




38Panel A:  Broad Bracketing Level.  
Choice Set 1. Risk Management Tools
Strategy 1 2 3 4 Total
1 1 0 0 11 12
20 14 0 130 144
30 1 2 60 63
4 0 66 2 822 890
Total 1 81 4 1023 1109
Panel B: Medium Braketing Level.  
Choice Set 1. Forward Pricing Instruments Choice Set 2. Crop Insurance Products
Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1 11 004 21 504 3 7 5 1 7 14 1 130 0 0 4 0 156
21 3 0 11 0 15 0 10 40 2 5 20 0 118 2 0 6 0 151
30 0 1 3 0 14 0 5 23 3 2 2 1 6 5 0050 7 5
41 1 1 44 3 119 0 48 217 4 9 6 3 316 00733 4 4
54 0 0 1 3 9 73 0 62 161 5 2 12 0 88 0 0 6 0 108
6 2 0 0 40 4 219 0 48 313 6 1 2 1 63 0 0 01 6 8
73 0 0 71 1 2 0 16 39 7 7 12 2 114 2 0 7 1 145
88 2 0 2 9 8 6 5 0 129 241 8 1 5 0 52 0 0 2 3 63
Total 30 6 2 151 27 532 0 361 1109 Total 34 73 8 946 4 0 37 8 1110
Figure 3.  Actual versus Predicted Choices of Risk Management Tools.






















 39Panel C: Narrow Bracketing Level.
Choice Set 1. Exchange Instuments Choice Set 2. Exchange-Derived Instuments Choice Set 3. Non-Exchange-Derived Instruments
Strategy 1 2 3 4 Total Strategy 1 2 3 4 Total Strategy 1 2 3 4 Total
1 440 5 7 64 516 1 530 0 36 7 573 1 11 0 166 0 177
2 109 5 3 66 183 2 59 0 726 8 2 0 1 19 0 20
3 104 2 11 28 145 3 251 0 50 7 308 3 10 1 776 0 787
4 121 4 5 136 266 4 126 0 25 9 160 4 2 0 124 0 126
Total 774 16 26 294 1110 Total 966 0 118 25 1109 Total 23 2 1085 0 1110
Choice Set 4. CAT Insurance Choice Set 5. Yield Insurance Choice Set 6. Revenue Insurance
Strategy 1 2 Total Strategy 1 2 3 4 Total Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1 594 49 643 1 796 0 0 0 796 1 256 234 0 0 0 0 0 0 490
2 381 86 467 2 76 0 0 0 76 2 181 321 1 0 0 0 0 0 503
Total 975 135 1110 3 23 0 0 0 23 3 13 27 1 000004 1
4 215 0 0 0 215 4 12 14 0 1 00002 7
Total 1110 0 0 0 1110 5 8 9 0 0 0 0001 7
600 0002 002
71 21 4 0 0 0 0 0 02 6
822 00000 0 4
Total 484 621 2 1 0 2 0 0 1110
Figure 3 (Continued).  Actual versus Predicted Choices of Risk Management Tools.
Notes: Strategies correspond to narrow level bracketing strategies described in Figure 2.
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